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Introduction
Jacques Maritain’s keen philosophical genius 
has run the gamut of philosophical inquiry. No 
branch of philosophy has escaped his penetrating 
analysis. The Degrees of Knowledge, published in 
1932, is perhaps his greatest work. In this his 
power for speculative reasoning reaches its high­
est perfection, . His Art and Scholasticism, the 
final result of his earlier serious study of art 
and poetry— a work opening up new vistas for ar­
tists and critics alike— has already become a 
classic in the field of aesthetics. His later 
works are developments of his social and polit­
ical thought and have been occasioned by his 
growing awareness that the order of speculative 
thought, based as it is on reality, must somehow 
impregnate social and political life. This very 
order and development that we see in Maritain’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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philosophy witnesses to his eudaemonism as dis­
tinguished from the deontologism of most of his 
contemporaries. Freedom in the Modern World and 
True Humanism are the most complete expressions 
of his mature social and political thought, and 
added insights may be gained from his most recent 
works Scholasticism and Politics, The Rights of 
Man and natural Law, and Christianity and Democ­
racy.
Althotigh his first interests were chiefly 
metaphysics and aesthetics, Maritain was also 
very conscious of the practical problems to be 
solved in the society in which he lived. This 
is only what we would expect of him. Speaking 
of the true metaphysician, he says that ”he must 
not be exclusively an intellect. His equipment 
of senses must be in good order. He must be keen­
ly and profoundly aware of sensible objects. And 
he should be plunged into existence, steeped ever 
more deeply in it by a sensuous and aesthetic per­
ception as acute as possible, and by experiencing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the suffering and struggles of real life, so that, 
aloft in the third heaven of natural understand­
ing, he may feed upon the intelligible substance 
of things."1 As a result of this interest in life, 
in people, and in things, Maritain soon became pro­
foundly aware of the chaotic conditions of the mod­
ern world with its Cartesian idealism and Rousseau- 
an naturalism. For him, "the disease afflicting 
the modern world is in the first place a disease 
of the mind.,T^  Man as an intellectual creature 
is superior to vegetative and sensitive creatures, 
but nevertheless he is at the lowest level of in­
tellectuality. He does not intuit things as do 
the angels, but rather he is dependent for his 
knowledge, at least extrinsically, on external 
things, from which the intellect abstracts the 
intelligible form.. All knowledge, then, must be 
based on the nature of things. Maritain had found 
such-a knowledge in the philosophy of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, the great medieval master who had built 
on the solid rock of Aristotelian metaphysics his
1. J. Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysios, p. 23-24.
2. J. Maritain, The Angelic Doctor, p. 90.
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great philosophic synthesis. After a profound 
study of St. Thomas’ -works, he determined to de­
velop and to apply the principles of his phil­
osophy to the problems of the day— MVae mihi si 
non thomistizavero.’’-5- In this vocation Maritain 
has become a creative writer in himself, drawing 
out the hidden implications of fundamental prin­
ciples found in Aristotle and St. Thomas and apply­
ing them to the concrete historical circumstances 
of the modern world.
Great, however, as is the respect with which 
Maritain’s thought is always received in philos­
ophic circles, many worshipers of the Myth of Pro­
gress object that he is lost in out-moded medieval 
speculation and that therefore his conclusions 
must of necessity be vacuous. Mhritain himself 
seems to have anticipated this objection and noth­
ing could be more convincing in refuting it than 
his own words from his AntImoderne, one of his 
first books as he set out on his new mission:
wJe n'ai pas besoin de dire qu’il ne s’agit pas la
1. J. Maritain, Antimoderne. p. 14.
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non pins d’un attachement servile a saint Thomas et a 
Aristote, et d'nne maniere de philosopher qni consis- 
terait a rlp^ ster leurs formules d'nne fag on mlcanique.
II s’agit d’nne fidllite spirituelle et filiale. qui 
fait ehercher dans lenrs principes activement mlditis, 
groupes, coordonnes, le moyen de decouvrir, d'inventer 
la solution des problernes nouveaux qni peuvent se poser 
de nos jours, et cela grace a un effort original de 
1*esprit. Car c'est implicitement et virtuellement. 
ce n’est pas explicitement que ces principes contien- 
nent la reponse a tout nouveau probleme philosophique, 
ou plut8t aux nouvelles determinations et aux nouveaux 
modes que les eternels problemes philosophiques peuvent 
recevoir de nos jours.
Maritain assails the false view that philosophy 
must strive in every respect for the new as oppos­
ed to the old. Development in philosophy consists 
in a deeper penetration of the same eternal prin­
ciples— "Real development is not leaving things be­
hind, as on a road, btit drawing life from them as 
from a root. Even when we improve we never progress. 
For progress, the metaphor from the road, implies a 
man leaving his home behind him: but improvement
means a man exalting the towers and extending the 
gardens of his horne.'1^  Maritain strives for the in­
forming of the changing historical circumstances of 
the modern world by the eternal principles found in 
Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas in a manner analogous
1. J. Maritain, Antimoderne. p. 135-134.
2. G. K. Chesterton, The Victorian Age in Literature, 
p. 12.
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to the informing of an individual matter by a 
specific form. The resultant society, then, will 
not be simply an assemblage of new temporal cir­
cumstances, nor an assemblage of eternal princip­
les, but a composition of the two.
Maritain repeatedly lashes out at the errors 
in social and political philosophy arising from 
the failure of men to take into account the nature 
of things. In this study, following the scholas­
tic tradition, we will give first Maritain’s cri­
tique of existing systems— of Liberalism, Capital­
ism, Socialism, Communism, and Totalitarianism—  
and we will show how his political humanism devel­
ops consistently, and almost inevitably, from his 
own regard for the nature of things.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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I
C?ritique of Liberalism
Liberalism is that system of thought which 
grew up in the eighteenth and nineteenth centur­
ies. It chose as its primary principle that 
which the word itself indicates, namely, liberty. 
However, liberty for liberalism did not retain 
its traditional meaning. Liberty, correctly un­
derstood, is the privilege of creatures endowed 
with mind or reason— "Necesse est quod homo sit 
liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est."-1* 
Liberty, then, is essentially the faculty of be­
ing able to choose between the means conducing 
to an end, for he who has the faculty of choos­
ing one thing among many is master of his act­
ions. For liberalism, however, liberty is some- 
thing physical rather than moral.— anyone is free
1. Summa Theologies, I, 83, 1.
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to do, to say or to think -whatever he likes with­
out any regard for society, tradition, objective 
standards or authority. The fundamental principle 
of liberalism is absolute freedom of speech, press, 
politics, conscience and religion. Liberalism 
abandons the social, political and economic order 
to the government of a spontaneous nature— its 
battle cry is ’laissez-faire; laissez-aller; lai- 
ssez-passer.” The State, whose function is pure­
ly negative, must not interfere with business, 
for to do so would be interference and the des­
truction of liberty. The right to the use of 
private property, then, becomes absolute. Since 
might is right for liberalism, private property 
is at the mercy of individual whims, and the use 
of private property is not restrained by the de­
mands of the common good or by any moral consid­
erations.
Maritain’s opposition to liberalism is based 
on the principle that freedom must be ruled by 
right reason; freedom must have a norm and a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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guide— ’’Because of its imperfection— and because, 
being subject to becoming we must in all things 
begin with the imperfect and little by little 
grow up to adult age— human liberty needs to be 
protected: that is the important thing....And in 
the first place it needed a law or ordinance of 
reason, a rule of what to do and what not to do.”l 
Maritain cites Leo XlII’s encyclical Llbertas 
Praestantissimum in support of his criticism of 
liberalism:
’’Nothing more absurd or perverse could 
be said or imagined than the statement that 
man, being naturally free, ought to be ex­
empt from all law; if it were so, the con­
sequence would be that it is necessary for 
liberty not to be in accordance with rea­
son: whereas it is the contrary which is 
true, namely, that man ought to be subject 
to law precisely because he is by nature 
free....Of its very nature then and con­
sidered from any angle whatever, in indiv­
iduals or societies, in superiors no less 
than, in subordinates, human liberty implies 
the necessity of obedience to a supreme 
eternal rule, which is no other than the 
authority of God in His Commandments or 
prohibitions to us. This perfectly proper 
sovereignty, so far from destroying or im­
pairing liberty in any degree, on the con­
trary protects it and brings it to its per­
fection. For the true perfection of every 
being consists in pursuing and attaining
1. J. Maritain, The Things That Are Not Caesar’s, 
p. 135.
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Its end: now the supreme end to which human 
liberty should aspire is God.” -^
Law, then, does not destroy freedom; rather, 
it is the pedagogue of freedom— it teaohes us how 
to live. Consequently, in choosing means to his 
last end, man must be guided by law and by the de­
mands of the common good.
1. Leo XIII, Libertas Praestantissimum.
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II
Critique of Capitalism
In the economic order, Liberalism is known 
as Capitalism. Capitalism has been defined by 
Leo XIII as "a system by which great masses of 
wage-earners are so subject to capital in the 
hands of a few that they are able to divert 
business and economic activity to their own ar­
bitrary will and advantage, without any regard 
for the human dignity of workers, the social 
character of economic life, social justice or 
the common good."I The ” spirit” of capitalism 
is a spirit of hatred of the poor, of contem­
plation, of cultural values, of simplicity, of 
humility, of truth. It exalts the productive 
and inventive powers of man. Its ”God" is mat­
erial wealth and riches. Capitalism pertains
1. Leo XIII, Rerum No varum.
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to the category of quantity— it is concerned 
with ever-increased wealth. It is not concer­
ned with quality or with human values. Every­
thing is the object of acquisition. Internal 
values suffer. All the movements of the soul 
and heart are annihilated before the practical 
affairs of life. The dignity of the human per­
son and the dignity of work are forgotten in the 
face of the supposedly more important problems 
of money, riches, production, new techniques of 
saving, etc. True finality is ignored, and with 
it philosophy and reason are cast aside. Man 
becomes a slave of matter:
MEounded upon the two unnatural prin­
ciples of the fecundity of money and the 
finality of the useful, multiplying its 
needs and servitudes without any possibil­
ity of there ever being a limit, ruining 
the leisure of the soul, withdrawing the 
material factibile from the control which 
proportioned it to the ends of the human 
being, imposing on man its puffing machin­
ery and its speeding up of matter, the 
modern world is shaping human activity in^ 
a properly inhuman way, in a properly devil­
ish direction, for the ultimate end of all 
this frenzy is to prevent man from remember­
ing G-od,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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dum nil perenne cogitat, 
seseque culpis illigat.
He must, consequently, if he is to be log­
ical, regard as useless, and therefore des­
picable, everything which for any reason 
bears the mark of the spirit.
Maritain*s criticism of Capitalism is based 
on ethical and spiritual values and on the prim­
ary social value of human personality. He insists 
that the rational life of man is ordered to the 
accomplishment of true freedom of autonomy. Al­
though the type of economy which lies at the base 
of the capitalist regime is not in abstract prin­
ciple or in its ideal scheme fundamentally immor­
al, as Marx thought, it must be confessed Mthat 
in point of fact, and tested not only by its id­
eal operation but also by the spirit it has shown 
in history and by the actual ways in which this 
spirit has become manifest in the institutions 
of human society, the capitalist regime is wedded 
to the unnatural principle of the fertility of 
money.1,2 Maritain’s most basic condemnation of 
this unnatural principle at the base of the cap­
italist economy is found in his book Religion
1. J. Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 37.
2. 1. Maritain, 'Freedom in the Modern World, 
p. 127.
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and Culture?
’’Instead of being considered as a mere 
feeder enabling a living organism, which the 
productive undertaking is, to procure the 
necessary material and equipment, money has 
come to be considered the living organism 
and the undertaking with its human activit­
ies as the feeder and instrument of money; 
so that the profits cease to be the normal 
fruit of the undertaking fed with money, 
and become the normal fruit of money fed 
by the undertaking. "Values have been re­
versed and the immediate consequence is to 
give the rights of dividend precedence over 
those of wages and salary and to establish 
the whole economy under the supreme regul­
ation of the laws and the fluidity of the 
’sign’ money predominating over the ’thing’, 
commodities useful to mankind, "l-
We must respect the nature of things, and
therefore we must uphold the primacy of quality
over quantity, of work over money, of human over
technical means, of wisdom over science.
1. J . Maritain, Religion and Culture, p. 62.
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III
Critique of Socialism
Socialism believes in the greatest possible 
accumulation of wealth and the equal distribut­
ion of it among the members of society. Priv­
ate property, then, is ruled out, and its use 
is governed only by the needs of society, with 
no moral considerations. The goods of indiv­
iduals would be made common to all, and the men 
who preside over a municipality or who direct 
the entire State should act as administrators 
of these goods. Socialism pins its faith on 
material things, on mechanical industrial arr­
angements, on a new economic order which is to 
come into being by the operation of material 
forces:
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’’Socialism, completely ignoring the 
sublime destiny of man and of society, or 
not taking it into account at all, supp­
oses the human community to be constituted 
only with a view to material well-being.”!
It is not in the least interested in the con­
scious cultivation of moral qualities and soc­
ial virtues. If it believes in these at all, 
it holds that they will be the outcome of the 
new economic system. Its one and chief pre­
occupation is to nourish discontent in the 
heart of the laborer and to fan the hatred of 
the prevailing economic system into a devas­
tating flame.
In opposition to Socialism, Maritain main­
tains that ”in seeking help for the masses this 
principle before all is to be considered as 
basic, namely, that private ownership must be 
preserved inviolate.”s Por Maritain, following 
St. Thomas, the first principle to be noted 
with regard to private property is that all 
material things belong to man, considered in 
his specific nature, and he has the right of
1. Pius XI, Q.uadragesimo Anno.
S. Leo XIII, Rerum No varum.
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appropriation:
".....et sio habet homo naturale do­
minium exteriorum rerum, quia per ratio- 
nem et voluntatem potest uti rebus exter- 
ioribus ad suam utilitatem, quasi propter 
se factis; semper enim imperfectiora sunt 
propter perfectiora."!
The second principle is that man may best appro­
priate material things by individual appropri­
ation, that is, by one man owning a certain 
specific part of material things:
"The rights of man over material th­
ings imply in fact the power to manage, 
administer and use these goods."2
In this he follows almost literally St. Thomas
who says:
" .....circa rem exteriorem duo com- 
petunt homini. Quorum unum est potestas 
procurandi et dispensandi.....Aliud vero 
quod competit homini circa res exteriores 
est usus ipsarum."3
This power as a rule can be properly exercised
only by individual persons. Only thus can one
hope to secure the care that is required in the
management of goods. St. Thomas expresses it
thus:
"Si consideretur iste ager absolute,
1. Summa Theologica, II-II, 66, 1.
Freedom in the Modern World, p. 94.
3. Summa Theologies, II-II, 66, S.
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non habet unde magis sit hujus quarn illius; 
sed^si consideretur per respectum ad oppor- 
tunitatem colendi et ad pacificum usum agri, 
secundum, hoc habet quandam coramensuratipnem. 
ad hoc quod sit unius et non alterius.’1^
Maritain then proceeds to determine more pre­
cisely what are the elements in human nature on 
which the general right to own property is found­
ed; what is it in human nature that calls for the 
individual appropriation of material goods? He 
finds this general postulate in the activity of 
man as maker— or as artist in the broad sense of 
the word— an activity which springs from the 
very essence of personality.
According to him, the nature of man admits of 
two different activities. There is the poetic 
activity, or activity concerned with the making 
of things, and the object of this is the fao- 
tibile, the thing to be male or produced. Man is 
an ”artist” in the sense that he fashions mater­
ial things, and moulds them to his liking. There 
is also the ethical or practical activity, and 
the object of this is the agibile, or the thing 
to be done. Now, it is the artistic or poetic
!• Summa Theologica, II-II, 57, 4.
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activity of man, requiring as it does a fao- 
tibile, which is the metaphysical basis for the 
individual appropriation of property— if man is 
to make something or fashion something, he can 
best do this by owning the material to be fash­
ioned or made. It is the ethical or practical 
activity of man which limits the use by an in­
dividual of a specific piece of material or 
property.
An individual man, then, may own private 
property, but his use of it is not absolute—  
the function and purpose of the property must 
be considered; the rights of others must be 
considered; the common good must be considered. 
The essential thing to remember is that proper­
ty must be governed by reason— function and 
purpose determine its" use. There are no static 
rules for different holdings of property; uni­
versal principles must be applied analogically 
to different concrete circumstances. Thus Mar­
itain, appealing as usual to the nature of man
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and of things, defends the right to private 
property and the right to the relative, func­
tional use of private property.
Socialism is to be rejected, too, for com­
pletely ignoring the relationship between God 
and man. It refuses to see in man the creature 
and image of G-od. Socialism may admit that God 
exists, but it "makes of God Himself an idol, 
because it denies in act, if not in word, the 
nature and transcendence of God."-1- In this Mar­
itain has the approval of Pius II who says:
"Society, then, as Socialism dreams of 
it, cannot, on the one hand exist, or even 
come into being, without the use of mani­
festly excessive compulsion and, on the 
other hand, enjoys a license no less false, 
since in it no room is found for true soc­
ial authority, which cannot be founded on 
temporal or material interests, but descends 
from God alone, Creator and Last End of all 
things."2
1. J. Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, p. 13. 
B. Pius XI, O.uadragesimo Anno.
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IT
Critique of Communism
Communism is based on the principles of dia­
lectical and historical materialism advocated by 
Marx. According to Maritain, the social solut­
ions of Communism, which are concerned with la­
bor organization and the secular community, can­
not be taken apart from atheism, which has to do 
with religion and metaphysics, maintaining rather 
that ’’Communism as it exists— above all the Comm­
unism of the Soviet republics— is a complete sys­
tem of doctrine and life which claims to reveal 
to man the meaning of his existence, to answer 
all the fundamental questions which are set by 
life, and which manifests an unequalled power of 
totalitarian inclusiveness.’’-1- it is, then, not 
merely an economic system alone, but a ’’philosophy
1. J. Maritain, True Humanism, p. 28.
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of life based on a coherent and absolute rejec­
tion of divine transcendence, a discipline of 
life and a mysticism of integral revolutionary 
materialism.Matter is the only reality in 
the world. Human society itself is nothing 
but a phenomenon and form of matter. Matter 
is a dynamic and active thing, and this dy­
namism will of itself inevitably bring to ac­
tuality man and mind and human society and the 
perfection of human society. Since there is no 
difference between soul and body, man has no 
liberty or human dignity. All rights of the 
individual are subordinate to the common good. 
Absolute equality of individuals is preached, 
thus rejecting all hierarchy and authority.
All forms of private property are ruled out—  
the title to, and the use of, private property 
should be in common. Based on these material­
istic tenets of Communism, human society would 
be rta collectivity with no other hierarchy than 
that of the economic system. It would have only
1. J. Maritain, Christianity and Democracy, p. 82.
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one mission: the production of material things 
by means of collective labor, so that the goods 
of this world might be enjoyed in a paradise 
where each would ’give according to his powers’ 
and would ’receive according to his needs’.”! 
Morality and law would be divorced from their 
metaphysical foundations, and would become in­
stead ephemeral derivations of the economic or­
der. The existence of any eternal truths is 
rejected— there are no values which transcend 
either the individual or time or space. There 
is no place for the person as the ultimate norm 
of spiritual existence and for his proper val­
ues, freedom and love. Rather, the person is 
utterly and absolutely subordinate, in all that 
he is and has, to whatever povers are above him.
The State, too, must be abolished. Denying 
the social nature of man, Communism rejects the 
family as the first societal form, and, as a 
necessary consequence, rejects the State also. 
The whole social order must be overthrown, and
1. Pius XI, Atheistic Communism,
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in its place an entirely new order must arise. 
The exploitation of the poor and the oppressed 
majority by the privileged minority in the Cap­
italist economy must be violently opposed. The 
"exploited" must wage a bitter war against the 
"exploiter", bringing him down from his high 
level of wealth, power and influence. Finally, 
when all are levelled off, when there are no 
longer any exploiters who need the protection 
of the State, society will be a single classless 
class, and the State will disappear.
Maritain’s criticism of Communism is based 
again on the nature of man and of things. Acc­
ording to him, "St. Thomas.... shows by five 
different arguments how? the conclusion ’G-od ex­
ists’ is imposed with absolute necessity on the 
human reason."-1- We see in the world things cap­
able of being and not being, things graded in 
degrees of perfection, things disposed tow?ards 
an object or end. To account for all this, "we 
are compelled....to admit a Cause which moves 
without being moved, causes without being caused,
1. J. Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, 
p . £58.
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cannot lack existence, contains in its purity 
the perfection of which things partake in great­
er or less degree, possesses an intellect which 
is the final ground of all natures and the first 
principle of all things. Such a Cause we term 
’God’; it is pure act, deriving its existence 
from itself (a se).”-®- Man, admittedly a mater­
ial body, is nevertheless endowed with a form 
or a soul, immaterial and spiritual, and there­
fore nobler, capable of reason and free-will. 
Matter, then, is not the only reality:
’’Marx saw- the essential importance of 
material causality, but he made it purely 
and simply primary.”2
By reason of his,intellect and will, each indiv­
idual person possesses certain liberties and cer­
tain rights. Not all of the rights of the indiv­
idual are subordinate to the common good. By re­
ason of certain things that are in him, by reason 
of the fact that he is an individual of a species, 
man in his entirety wrould belong to society, but 
not by reason of himself as a whole:
1. An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 258.
2. True Humanism, p. 37.
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’’Homo non ordinatur ad communitatem pol- 
iticam secundum se toturn et secundum omnia 
sua.M 1
By reason of still other things that are in him, 
by reason of the ordering of the personality as 
such to the absolute, man transcends society:
”Totum quod homo est, et quod potest et 
habet, ordinandum est ad Deum; et ideo omnis 
actus hominis bonus vel malus habet rationem 
meriti vel demeriti apud Deum, quantum est 
ex ipsa ratione actus.”2
The Communist demand for absolute equality 
and for a classless society is not in accord 
with human nature. Pope Leo XIII, in his ency­
clical Rerum No varum, which Maritain quotes re­
peatedly, says:
”Let it be laid down, in the first place, 
that humanity must remain as it is. It is 
impossible to reduce human society to a level 
....There naturally exist among mankind in­
numerable differences of the most important 
kind; people differ in capability, in dili­
gence, in health, and in strength; and un­
equal fortune is a necessary result of in­
equality in condition.”3
It is true that men are equal in so far as each
man is possessed of a human nature, created by
G-od and destined for G-od, but in his individual
1. Summa Theologica, I-II, 21, 4, ad 3.
2. Ibid.
3. Leo XIII, Rerum No varum.
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potentialities and actualities each individual 
man differs from every other man. Inequalities 
of all kinds, then, exist by the very nature of 
things, and the Communist ideal of establishing 
a classless society is impossible of attainment.
Communism, so intent on abolishing all ex­
ploitation, concludes illogically that all ex­
ploitation is the result of private ownership. 
Rather, exploitation is the result of the abuse 
of the right to private property. We have al­
ready given Maritain’s defence of private pro­
perty by a metaphysical argument. Briefly, ag­
ain, the argument is that ” individual owner­
ship of material goods is based on a spiritual 
foundation, on the capacity of the rational be­
ing as an intellectual substance to give form 
to matter.’1^
1. Freedom in the Modern World, p. 211.
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Y
Critique of Totalitarianism
Maritain says of Totalitarianism that ”we 
may call ’totalitarian’ any conception in which 
the politic community,— whether it be the State 
in the strict sense of the word or the organized 
collectivity,— claims the entire man for itself, 
either to shape or to be the end of all his act­
ivities, or indeed to be in itself the essence 
of his personality and his dignity. Thus, accor' 
ding to Signor Mussolini, the State is ’the ver­
itable reality of the individual’; the Fascist 
State is ’the highest and most potent form of 
personality’; ’nothing human or spiritual, in 
so far as it has any value, exists outside the 
State; ’its principle, the directing inspiration 
of human personality joined in one society,
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penetrates into the soul....the soul of the soul.’” -^ 
No totalitarian regime, whether it be Fascism, Naz­
ism or any other concrete expression of totalitar­
ian principles, recognizes any organized limitat­
ion of the political realm and power. Totalitar­
ianism subjects all things,— material as well as 
spiritual and moral,— to the State. Everything 
exists for the State— the State is supreme in ev­
erything. The religious and ethical basis of pol­
itics is rejected; power politics is the ’’ultimate 
end” ; the State is not only the ’’societas perfecta” 
in its own order but the ’’societas perfecta” in an 
absolute sense. The State is the present god; the 
racial substance of the people or the national myth 
or the classless society decide exclusively what 
the common good is. The State determines exclusive­
ly the aim of education and the aim of marriage. In 
short, Totalitarianism insists that the State is 
supreme in everything.
Maritain’s criticism of Totalitarianism is based 
again on the nature of man.
1. True Humanism, p. 128, Note 2.
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’’Fascism... .has as metaphysical root an 
absolute pessimism of a rather voluntaristic 
ana Machiavellian sort. Practically, it de­
nies that man comes from the hands of G-od, 
and that he maintains within him, in spite 
of everything, the grandeur and dignity of 
such an origin. This pessimism, which in­
vokes incontestable empirical truths, turns 
these truths into ontological lies, because 
it is indifferent to the fact that man comes 
from God. Then it despairs of man— I mean 
of the human person, the individual person—  
in favor of the State. Not God but the State 
will create man; the State by its constraints 
will oblige man to come forth from the noth­
ingness of the anarchy of the passions, and 
lead an upright and even heroic life.”!
For Maritain, as for Aristotle and St. Thomas 
Aquinas, man is a social and political animal.
The human person craves social and political life, 
not only with regard to the family community, but 
also with regard to the civil community. Man 
tends, then, by his very nature to social life 
and to communion, not only because of the needs 
of human nature, by reason of which each one of 
us has need of others for his material, intell­
ectual and moral life, but also because of the 
desire of that human nature to express itself 
to others in acts of intelligence and love. As 
a person, man is an individual substance of a
1. Scholasticism and Politics, p. IE.
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rational nature, more a whole than a part and 
more independent than servile. No?;, by reason 
of certain things that are in him, by reason of' 
the fact that he is an individual of a species, 
man in his entirety vrould belong to society, 
but not by reason of himself as a whole. By re­
ason of still other things that are in him, by 
reason of the ordering of his personality as 
such to the absolute, man transcends society. 
Totalitarianism, then, is false, based as it is 
on a false notion of the nature of man and of 
society. The distinction bet?«en the individual 
and the person and the implications of the not­
ion of personality will be discussed at greater 
length shortly as the fundamental principle of 
Maritain’s own social philosophy.
We have seen how Maritain bases his criti­
cism of Liberalism, Capitalism, Socialism, Comm­
unism and Totalitarianism, on the nature of man 
and of things. His arguments are almost wholly 
metaphysical, and when he resorts to arguments
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from expediency, it is merely to substantiate 
the metaphysical arguments.
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Maritain’s Political Humanism
Maritain’s own conception of political soc­
iety is "based... .upon the reality of human nat­
ure and the human person, and it develops from 
its own principles in a necessary manner.’*-*- He 
himself calls it a ’’humanist political philosophy, 
or a political humanism.’*2 Before proceeding to 
show in detail the development of Maritain’s th­
ought from the nature of things, it will be best, 
for the sake of clarity and perspective, to men­
tion the keynotes of the system. Maritain’s soc­
iety, then, would be personalist, communal, plur­
alist , and founded on the ordered relationship 
of the spiritual and the temporal.
The basic principle of Maritain’s whole soc­
ial philosophy is the distinction between the
1. J. Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, 
p . 50.
2. Ibid.
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individual and the person. Man is an individual, 
but he is also a person, and, by drawing out all 
the hidden implications of this distinction, Mar- 
itain fashions his political humanism. The dis­
tinction is not a new one— "it is indeed a classic 
distinction, belonging to the intellectual heri­
tage of humanity."-5- It is fundamental in the doc­
trine of St. Thomas Aquinas. Maritain, however, 
is one of the first Thomists to apply the distin­
ction in all its fulness to social problems:
"After attempting to explain how man is 
as a whole an individual and also as a whole 
a person, and how at the' same time the focus 
of individuality is quite distinct from that 
of personality, I will consider the appli­
cations of this distinction, especially in 
social matters."*3
Man is an individual, just as any other re­
ality outside the mind is an individual. Within 
the mind things are in a state of universality; 
outside the mind things are in a state of indiv­
iduality. Material things are individual. An­
gels, too, are individual essences. The Divine 
Essence itself is supremely individual. In the
1* Scholasticism and Politics, p. 58.
E. Ibid., p. 56.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 35
case of pure spirits, of pure forms unalloyed 
with any matter, the very form itself is the 
principle of individuation. But, according to 
St. Thomas Aquinas, in the case of material 
beings composed of matter and form, and there­
fore in man, the principle of individuation is 
matter— "materia signata". Matter is the prin­
ciple of division; it seeks to occupy a certain 
position, to have quantity, to be determined.
By matter, Maritain, following St. Thomas, un­
derstands prime matter— materia prima— "able 
neither to be nor to be thought by itself, and 
from which all corporeal beings are made.M^ 
Prime matter in itself is nothing actual; it 
is a principle in itself wholly indeterminate, 
incapable of separate existence, but capable 
of being actualized or ’informed’ by a form—  
this form being an active principle determin­
ing the prime matter, constituting with it 
one single thing actually existing, making it 
to be this or that particular thing.
1. Scholasticism and Politics, p. 60.
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Man, then, is an individual substance made 
up of matter and form, of body and soul. Des­
cartes maintained that the soul— thought— was 
one thing, complete in itself, and that the 
body— extension— was another thing, complete 
in itself. But this is not so. Rather, body 
and soul are two substantial co-principles, in­
complete in themselves, uniting to form one com­
plete being, man. For Maritain, therefore, 
following St. Thomas, man, as every other cor­
poreal being, has prime matter as the metaphy­
sical root of his individuality.
Man, however, while admittedly an animal 
and an individual, is unlike other animals or 
individuals. Man is an individual endowed with 
intellect and will, and therefore a person—  
’’persona est individua substantia naturae rat- 
ionabilis.”'*' The metaphysical root of person­
ality lies in the subsistence of a spiritual 
nature. Through his intellect and will, man 
transcends matter; he is a small world unto 
himself, he is responsible for his activities,
1. Boethius, The Theological Tractates, ed. by
H.F. Stewart and E. K . hand, p. 84.
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unlike anything else in the world; he becomes 
more independent than servile, more a whole 
than a part, more spiritual than physical—  
’’the person is a reality, which, subsisting 
spiritually, constitutes a universe by itself 
and an independent whole (relatively independ­
ent ), in the great whole of the universe and 
facing the transcendent Ifhole, which is God.”1 
Of all God’s creatures, man most closely re­
sembles the Creator--”persona significat id 
quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, sci­
licet subsistens in rational! natura.”^ Man 
is the very image of God, for God is pure 
spirit, and man, possessed of a spiritual nat­
ure, capable of knowing and loving, and endow­
ed with the life of grace, may know and love 
God as He knows and loves Himself. It is im­
portant to note, however, that while man is a 
person, he is not a pure person, just as he is 
not a pure spirit—
’’The notion of person is an analogous 
notion which is realized in different
1. Scholasticism and Politics, p. 63.
2. Summa Theologies, I-II, 29, 3.
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degrees and on essentially different planes 
of ontological being.
Man, possessed of intellect and mil, is at the 
highest level of animality, but also at the low­
est level of intellectuality, because the intell­
ectual form in man informs matter and is there­
fore subject to all the weaknesses of individ­
uation by "materia signata". Man, then, at the 
lowest level of intellectuality, is also at the 
lowest level of personality, since the intellect 
or spirit, as we have seen, is the metaphysical 
root of personality. For this reason, "person­
ality in the case of man is precarious and al­
ways in peril and must be achieved by a kind of 
progress."2
Man, then, has two metaphysical aspects— he 
is at one and the same time both an individual 
and a person. These, again, are not -two separ­
ate things. There is not in man one reality 
called individuality and another reality called 
personality. The same being is, in one sense, 
an individual, and, in another sense, a person.
1. Freedom in the Modern World, p. 47.
2. Ibid., p. 48.
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Both the individual and the person are present 
and active in each of man’s actions, because 
activity is ascribed to subsisting wholes, and 
not merely to the parts— ’’Actiones sunt suppos- 
it orum”.1
It is not to be thought that individuality, 
rooted in matter, and therefore inferior to per­
sonality, rooted in spirit, is something bad. 
Rather, since material individuality is the very 
basis of our existence, it is something good, 
but it is precisely because of the natural re­
lationship of individuality to personality that 
individuality is good. As long as individuality 
submits to the just dexmands of the superior per­
sonality, it is good, but, as soon as it reverses 
the natural order and seeks to predominate over 
personality, then it becomes bad. It is a trad­
itional, and yet very profound, saying in phil­
osophy— an expression sometimes attributed to 
Pindar— that man must become what he is, and it 
is in the nature of things that man is truly a 
man when in him the life of spirit and of freedom
1. Summa Theologica, I-II, 77, E ad 1.
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holds sway over the life of the passions and 
of the senses; when, indeed, the person rules 
the individual.
Maritain makes this classic distinction bet­
ween the individual and the person the basis of 
his whole social philosophy. As an individual, 
each man has need of his fellow men in order to 
realize his destiny in this world. Man, indeed, 
comes into being only by the cooperation of two 
human beings, and even after birth he requires 
that their union be permanent so that he may 
receive the care and attention that he needs 
in his early years. During his life, he re­
quires not only the ’hie et nuncf cooperation 
of his fellow men, but he is also, at every 
turn, making use of the material and spiritual 
heritage of all men who have ever, lived. His 
material, intellectual and moral life demands 
that he live in society with other men. As a 
person, too, man seeks communion with other 
men. The person seeks to give freely and whole­
heartedly; the person strives to use his intellect
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and will in aots of intelligence and love; the 
person wants to understand and to love, to be 
understood and to be loved. The person cannot 
be alone— ’’....the person requires society both 
per abundantlam or as a person, and per indi­
gent jam or as an individual.”1 Society, then, 
is natural to man, and, without it, man could 
not reach his full development or fulfill his 
destiny— ’’Homo naturaliter est pars alicujus 
multitudinis per quam praestetur sibi auxilium 
ad bene vivendum.”^
But what is the relation of man to society? 
Society is indeed made up of members as a whole 
is made up of parts. It would seem, therefore, 
that the good of the individual is subordinated 
to society or to the good of the whole. But we 
must remember that, when we say that man is a 
part of society, we do not mean that he bears 
the same relation to society as, for example, 
a piston to an engine. The engine is the sole 
reason for the existence of the piston— the 
piston is designed and made to be a part of an
1. J. Maritain, The Person and the Common Good,
in The Review of Politics, October 1946, p. 449.
2. Thomas Aquinas, In Decern Libros Ethioorum Aris-
totelis Ad Nichomaoum Exposltio, p. 3.
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engine. In itself, it malces no sense outside 
or without reference to the engine. Man, how­
ever, as we have seen, while an individual, is 
an individual of a rational nature, endowed 
with intellect and will. He is a knowing, self- 
governing individual, a master of his actions.
By reason of his immortal soul, he belongs to 
an eternal world— ’’the entire person is relative 
to the absolute, in which alone it can find its 
fulfillment. Its spiritual fatherland is the 
whole order of goods having an absolute value, 
and which serve as an introduction to the ab­
solute Whole, which transcends the world.’’-1- 
Man as a person, then, possesses eternal values. 
Nevertheless, it is true that in this life man, 
because of his wants as an individual and of 
his generosity as a person, needs society and 
becomes, in a very real sense, a part of soc­
iety. Obviously, then, man is both above and 
below society.
Maritain finds the solution to this diff­
iculty in two principles found in St. Thomas
1. Scholasticism and Politics, p. 64.
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Aquinas. The first principle is:
"Quaelibet persona singularis compar- 
atur ad totam communitatem sicut pars ad 
totum."1
This means that man, by virtue of certain of 
his own conditions, by virtue of some of the 
realities of his nature is below, and subor­
dinate to, society, and therefore exists with 
a view to the common good of society. The 
second principle is:
"Homo non ordinatur ad communitatem 
politicam secundum se totum et secundum 
omnia sua."2
Let us see now how, for Maritain, these 
two statements are to be related. He main­
tains that "if the entire man is a part of 
political society, he is nevertheless not a 
part of political society by virtue of him­
self as a whole and by virtue of all that is 
in him."3 By reason of certain things which 
ara in him, by reason of his wants as an in­
dividual and of his generosity as a person, 
man is in his entirety a part of political 
society. An example may help us to grasp the
1. Summa Theologlea, II-II, 64, 2.
2. So mm a The o log'i oa, I-II, 21, 4 ad 3.
3. The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 14.
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reality of the distinction. Just as a runner 
is in his whole being a runner and a scientist 
in his whole being a scientist, man is in his 
entirety a citizen. Man is a good runner by 
means of his neuro-muscular system and a good 
scientist by reason of his ability to observe 
and calculate. We cannot separate the runner 
or the scientist from the man in a runner or 
a scientist. When we see a runner or a scien­
tist coming towards us, we cannot properly say 
that the runner or the scientist is coming and 
that the man is not coming. Likewise, a man 
is a part of society by reason of his wants 
as an individual and of his generosity as a 
person, and so the whole man is a part of soc­
iety. Tor this reason, man may even be called 
upon to give his life for society. However, a 
runner, though he is a runner in his entirety, 
is not a runner, for instance, by reason of his 
knowledge of the Bible. By his knowledge of the 
Bible he belongs to a different order. Likewise, 
man, though he is a part of society, is a part
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of society by his needs, not by his relation 
to absolute truth and to his ultimate destiny,, 
By reason of the ordering of the human person 
to these absolute values, each individual man 
has rights which exist neither by the State nor 
for the State— indeed, in a very real sense, 
man transcends all human society.
Having distinguished the individual and the 
person, and having seen some of the implications 
of the distinction, it is only now that we may 
briefly define society. Society is a grouping 
of men to obtain a common end by common effort. 
The material cause of society is men. Society 
is made up of individual men, and man, as we 
have seen, tends by his very nature to social 
life. The formal cause of society is the gr­
ouping of men for a common good. Society is 
not mere multiplicity— in society there must 
be a prevailing unity. This social unity is 
to be provided by the common end, which is to 
be procured by common effort.
This communal nature of society is one of
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the pivotal points of Maritain’s political hu­
manism. Society is communal, and this means 
that society is ordered to a common good which 
is specifically different from the sum-total 
of the individual goods of individual persons, 
and which, at the same time, is nobler than the 
individual good, in so far as the individual, 
’qua’ individual, is a part of the social whole. 
Maritain contends that the common good is not 
a mere sum, that it is a new objective good 
essentially different from the sum of the goods 
of the individuals— it is the good proper to 
human persons as persons:
"Tlie common good of society is neither 
a mere collection of private goods, nor the 
good proper to a whole, which (as in the 
case of the species with regard to its in­
dividual members, or the hive with regard 
to the bees) draws the parts to itself alone, 
and sacrifices these parts to itself. It 
is the good human life of the multitude, of 
a multitude of persons, the good life of 
totalities at once carnal and spiritual, and 
principally spiritual....
This notion of the common good is the logical 
outcome of Maritain’s idea of society as a soc­
iety, not merely of individuals, but of persons.
1. The Rights of Man and Hatural Law, p. 8.
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Since the State is a reality, it must have a 
specific mode of being, namely, social being, 
and therefore it must have a specific end and 
purpose. Consequently, this end is qualitative­
ly distinct from the private good of the indiv­
idual and any kind of summation of such private 
goods.
"The common good....is the good human life of 
the multitude, of a multitude of persons, the 
good life of totalities at once carnal and spir­
itual,....” What does this really mean? We have 
seen that men live in society because they have 
material and spiritual needs. The common good, 
considered in its material aspects, would in­
clude such things as roads, bridges, railways, 
canals, etc., which are used by all members of 
society. Factories, too, which manufacture shoes, 
automobiles, etc., would be parts of the common 
good, because their products are acquired by var­
ious members of society for their use. All nat­
ural resources and establishments concerned with 
the utilization of natural resources are parts
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of the common good. But we have seen, too, 
that man as a person is a spiritual nature, 
and therefore the highest good of man is his 
moral and intellectual good. Society is or­
ganized to serve human beings. ’When we say, 
therefore, that the common good is principally 
the good life of spiritual totalities, we mean 
that it is primarily full intellectual and mor­
al life, or a communication in intellectual and 
moral perfection. We must make clear, however, 
that the fact that ultimately spiritual per­
fection is the end of social life does not de­
tract from the importance of material goods or 
of the economic order in society. Pius XI calls 
the economic order Ma fundamental order5’ and 
this statement is justified by the nature of 
things. Man is made up of body and soul, and 
his perfection does not consist in getting rid 
of the body. Man is not made of pure spirit.
He is rather made of matter and form, of body 
and soul, two substances incomplete in themselves, 
uniting to form one complete being. Por man,
1. Pius XI, Q.uadragesimo Anno.
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then, in his earthly life, the material life 
and the spiritual life form one life, in which 
the spiritual life should be the specifying, 
determining element.
The good of the individual members of soc­
iety is subordinate to the common good in pure­
ly social matters which concern man’s temporal 
happiness:
"Bonum universi est majus quam bonum 
particulare unius, si accipiatur utrumque 
in eodem genere.”!
The common good, however, does not take preced­
ence over the individual good when matters of 
grace or conscience, human personal liberties, 
or natural rights and duties are involved:
’’Bonum gratiae unius majus est quam 
bonum naturae totius universi.”
These values, by reason of man’s orientation as
a person to the absolute, are superior to any
demands of the common good.
The common good, then, is for man an end or
a purpose, but it is not his final end. The
natural ultimate end of all men is God, and it
1. Summa Theologica, I-II, 113, 9 ad 2.
2. Ibid.
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is essential that the common good respect and 
serve the natural order. Maritain calls the 
common good an "intermediate or infravelent 
end” He concedes that the common good is a 
final end in a given.order: "finis ultimus
secundum quid”2 but in itself relative or sub­
ordinate, intermediate or infravelent, to an 
absolute final end: "finis ultimus simpliciter”.3 
The common good is specifically different from 
the absolute final end of man, but it is part 
of its very essence that it be subordinated to 
that final end. It is a good and noble end in 
itself, but precisely so because of its role as 
an intermediate, infravelent end, subordinate 
to the ultimate end of man. It loses its good­
ness when it disregards this natural order and 
makes of itself an ultimate end.
The application of this concept of final
c
ends in distinct genera to social and political 
philosophy is one of Maritain’s most original 
contributions. It witnesses to his keen grasp 
of the specific value for our particular time
1. True Humanism, p. 127.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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of a principle formulated, but not fully devel­
oped, in the writings of Aristotle and St. Th­
omas. In the words of Dr. Gerald Phelan, a 
great admirer and student of Maritain, ’’this 
conception of political theory is fraught with 
weighty consequences for the doctrine of right 
and obligation in its application to the family 
and the various social groups within the State, . 
to the personal duties of the individual both 
as a private person and as a member of society, 
as a Christian and as a citizen.”^
Since the absolute final end of man is found 
outside, and not within, his intermediate or in­
fravelent end, it follows that the common good 
of society, or man’s intermediate or infravelent 
end, should in some way prepare for the attain­
ment of the ultimate end. The ultimate end of 
man is the possession of God, of the order of 
absolute values, of the fulness of personal 
life and spiritual liberty. The common good 
cannot of itself accomplish the perfect real­
ization of this ultimate end of man, for its
1. G. B. Phelan, Jacques Maritain, p. 27.
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perfect realization requires the very life of 
God in man's heart, but the common good should 
be truly a means to an end— it should provide 
the soil for the intellectual, moral and spir­
itual development of all men so that all may 
attain to God, to the fulness of personality, 
and to perfect spiritual liberty.
A first essential characteristic of the 
common good would be its quality of redistri­
bution. This implies that the material and 
spiritual wealth of society as a whole should 
flow back to benefit the individual— the indiv­
idual being considered not indeed as a mere 
part of the whole existing for the whole, as is 
the case in animal societies, but rather as a 
person and as a whole within a whole, a ’’finis 
cui" in its oiwn right. The common good of hu­
man society implies redistribution to the per­
sons as persons.
A second essential characteristic relates 
to authority. For Maritain, authority or gov­
ernment flows from the very nature of man and
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of the common good;
"....the essential function of authority 
is a necessary one. The necessity is gr­
ounded in the fact that the prudential judg­
ment is of an essentially different nature' 
from the scientific judgment, that the truth 
of prudence consists in the relation of con­
formity of the judgment with the require­
ments of a right appetite of the end to be 
pursued, and that consequently the pruden­
tial judgment can never be demonstrated, or 
intelie ctually inter sub j ect ivized."1
Maritain, then, agrees with Yves Simon that "how­
ever conscious the deliberation may be, since it 
cannot afford to prove its conclusions, anybody 
can, at any time, object that a better course of 
action could be conceived, and the unity of ac­
tion which is supposed to be required by the pur­
suit of the common good will be ceaselessly jeo­
pardized unless all members of the community ag­
ree to follow one prudential judgment and only 
one— which is to submit themselves to some author-
O
ity.” This metaphysical necessity of authority 
is expressly sanctioned by Leo XIII:
’’Society can neither subsist nor be con­
ceived if there is not a moderator to hold 
the balance between Individual wills, to 
make of their multitude a unity and to dir­
ect them with order to the common g o o d . "5
1. J. Maritain, On Authority in The Review of 
Politics. April 194E.
2. Yves Simon, The Nature and Functions of Author­
ity, p. 28-29.
3. Leo XIII, Diuturnum Illud.
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Authority, therefore, is essential to soc­
iety and is a necessary corollary of the nature 
of man and of the common good. In view of the 
function that it must perform, all authority 
must be implemented m t h  power. Authority with­
out power would become useless and inefficacious. 
Authority demands power in order that it may 
achieve the common good, while power demands 
authority in order that it may even exist:
"What is of absolutely primary importance 
is authority. To ’gain power’ is important 
for him who wants to act on the community.
To possess or acquire authority,— the right 
to be followed by the minds and by the wills 
of other men (and consequently the right to 
exercise power),-— is more important still.
All authority comes from God, the Creator of
man:
’’Per me reges regnant et legurn conditores 
Justa decernunt.”2
lust as, in the physical order, no being whatever
can exercise motion without deriving it from the
First Mover, so also, in the moral order, no man
possesses authority over another, except it be
given to him ultimately by the First Cause of all
1. Scholasticism and Politics, p. 93. 
s* Proverbs, VIII, 15.
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being,— God,
Social and political authority, then, is 
given a very high place as deriving from God 
Himself, but, by the same token, restrictions 
are placed upon it. Since authority comes 
from God, it may never act contrary to the 
will of God. Also, authority is not an end 
in itself, but a means to an end, and hence 
its very validity depends on its being dir­
ected to that end, namely, the common good.
It must also respect always the prior claims 
of other authorities that derive from God more 
immediately. Consequently, the Church, deriv­
ing from God Himself, and immediately related 
to man’s final end, should be assisted rather 
than hindered by social and political author­
ity, which is only mediately related to man’s 
final end. Again, the family is more immed­
iately related to man’s final end than civil 
society.
’’The domestic household is antecedent 
as well in idea as in fact to the gather­
ing together of men into a community* **1
1. Leo XIII, Rerum Ho varum.
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Therefore, social and political authority must 
never transgress the prior, and therefore high­
er, rights of the family.
Since authority derives immediately from 
God, it has a solid foundation which, it would 
not have otherwise. For, if the one exercising 
authority spoke in his own name only, his author­
ity would suffer from his own limitations and 
imperfections. Then, too, if the one exercis­
ing authority spoke as a mere puppet of the peo­
ple, his commands would have no sanction other 
than the arbitrary decision of the majority:
’’Too often instead of being reason in 
writing these laws express no more than the 
power of the number and predominant will of 
a political party.”•*-
The ordering of authority to God Who transcends
both the rules and the ruled makes the legitimate
commands.of authority binding in conscience.
Authority, then, necessary because of the very
nature of man and of the common good, ordered as
they are directly to God, must be intrinsically
moral. It must be exercised in the light of an
1. Leo XIII, Diuturnum Illud.
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awareness of moral good; it exists for the hu­
man person; it may not direct the human act 
away from the moral good, or towards that which 
is in conflict with the moral good. In seeking 
the common good, authority must not be guided 
by the mere whims of the ruler and his subjects 
but according to the dictates of law and jus­
tice :
"Civilization....is ordered to the ’totum 
bene vivere’ of the human being, and a right 
moral life is the essential thing in this 
’bene vivere’."1
That there should be authority in society, 
however, does not preclude the existence and 
exercise of freedom. Maritain distinguishes 
two meanings of the word "freedom". There is 
freedom of choice and freedom of autonomy. Fr­
eedom of choice means that the will of man, 
while it is not free when confronted with God, 
the "Summum Bonum", is nevertheless free of all 
internal or external constraint in its choice 
of intermediate ends or of means to those ends.
In irrational animals, the sensitive appe­
tite tends towards the particular, concrete
1. J. Maritain, Theonas, Tr. by F.I. Sheed, p. 154.
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good presented to it by the senses, but it is 
not a-ware of any objective quality in the good—  
it is not aware of goodness as such, just as it 
is not aware of being as such. In rational 
animals, or in man, there is a tendency towards 
the universal good as known by the intellect. 
Just as the intellect abstracts from the part­
icularizing notes of the object and reveals the 
objective form of Being, so too it abstracts 
and reveals the objective form of Goodness. It 
follows therefore that in man there is a power 
of loving and desiring the goodness as such, 
and this power is usually called the rational 
appetite or will. It Is clear from our own ex­
perience that this rational appetite or will is 
free in the choice of intermediate ends or of 
means to those ends. However, St. Thomas also 
argues from the nature of man as an intellectual 
being that he must be endowed of necessity with 
free will. The argument is that the will is 
necessarily directed to some good that is in no 
way limited, to some thing which satisfies its
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every desire. It follows, then, that no inter­
mediate or limited good can bind the will by 
its necessity. Because the m i l  tends by nat­
ure to the infinite and to the "Summum Bonum" 
for the perfect fulfillment of all its aspir­
ations, it must necessarily be free when con­
fronted with finite ends and particular goods 
which are entirely incapable of satisfying its 
desires. If man wills such and such a particular 
good, he still has the power not to will it. Man 
is free in his choice of all finite things.
The common good of society, then, demands au­
thority and the nature of man demands his liber­
ty. How do we reconcile the existence of law, 
the concrete expression of authority, with the 
existence of liberty in man? In reality, law is 
the pedagogue of liberty— it teaches us how to 
live. Man must live in conformity with the rules 
of reason and morality. The fact that man feels 
that he is a free agent is recognized as a valid 
argument for the existence of free-will. The con­
verse of the argument, therefore, must surely be
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given weight— namely, that no man feels it an 
affront to his sense of liberty that there is 
intellectual compulsion, or moral compulsion 
arising from conscience. There is no sense of 
constraint in accepting the mathematical fact 
that 2 plus 2 equals four. Similarly, there 
is no constraint in accepting the implications 
of a moral obligation so long as we understand 
and accept the terms of the proposition. St. 
Paul spoke of the freedom with which Christ 
made us free,-*- and in another place he speaks 
of our ’’reasonable service” ,^ by which he ob­
viously means the service of a free and in­
telligent being. This idea of reasonableness 
informs and qualifies the notion of liberty in 
the writings of the Pothers, and rightly so, 
since the concept of Reason gives full value 
to the claims of Lav? which are apt to be min­
imized, and even obscured, by those who in­
voke the name of Liberty in order to free them­
selves from the irksomeness of discipline.
The central paradox is that liberty must be
1. St. Paul, The Epistle to the G-alatians, Ch. 4, 
v. 31.
2. St. Paul, The Epistle to the Romans. Ch. 12, 
v. 1.
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limited by law or it destroys itself:
"liberty is the right to do that which 
the laws do not forbid; for if the citizen 
were able to do that which they forbid, it 
would no longer be liberty, because others 
would have the same power. "1-
If liberty is to be effective and worthwhile, 
it must in its own interests be constrained. 
Liberty is a gift of God, "the highest of natur­
al endowments";2 but it must be used in accord­
ance with the dictates of reason and the precepts 
of law. Between liberty and law there will be 
constant stress, and it is the duty of reason to 
maintain equilibrium between the inalienable 
rights of personal liberty and the legitimate 
demands of law.
But, for Maritain, as we have seen, there 
is another sense of the word freedom, and this 
is freedom of autonomy. Man possesses freedom, 
in the sense of free choice, by reason of his 
rational nature, but this freedom of choice is 
in reality only the source and spring of the 
true world of freedom— freedom in the sense of 
freedom of autonomy. Man is a person, an
1. Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Tr. by 
Thomas^Nugent, V.l.,' p. 155
2. Leo XIII, Berum Novarum.
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individual substance of a rational nature, mas­
ter of his own actions and of the material world 
about him. Freedom of autonomy consists in the 
most complete actualization in the psychological 
and moral order of all the potentialities of 
man’s metaphysical nature as a person. The free 
man, then, possessing true freedom of autonomy, 
would be self-sufficient; he would have to en­
dure no external constraint in his own life; he 
would have dominion over his own acts; and he
would be in himself ”a rounded and a whole ex­
istence.”1 It is evident, then, that freedom of 
choice, or freedom in the sense of free will, 
has not its own proper end, but it is essentially 
directed to the realization of freedom of auto­
nomy. The individual members of society, and 
society itself as a whole, should strive for the 
progressive realization of this freedom of auton­
omy, of that mastery of self and of material th­
ings, which is of the very essence of true per­
sonality. St. Thomas expressed in its embryonic 
stage this terminal notion of freedom, but its
1. Freedom in the Modern World, p. 30.
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precise and formal application to social phil­
osophy is one of Maritain’s most original con­
tributions.
The pluralistic nature of Maritain’s society 
would imply a much more developed form of plural­
ism than that of the Middle Ages. In the medi­
eval order, there was a predominant tendency to­
wards a strict unitary conception of the social 
structure. Pluralism, in the society Maritain 
envisions, would take a different form. Indeed, 
it is in his notion of a pluralistic society 
that Maritain makes one of his greatest contri­
butions. He is alive to the diversity of civil­
izations and of religions in the modern world. 
These different forms are not equivocal, nor in­
deed univocal, but rather analogical— they are 
alike in some respects and unlike in other re­
spects. Maritain is the first philosopher to 
apply the principle of pluralism to the hither­
to unequaled heterogeneity of modern social and 
political life.
There would be for him a just degree of
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regional administrative and political autonomy, 
which is quite permissible as long as the pol­
itical ideals and well-being of a higher order 
are not sacrificed to the political ideals and 
well-being of a lower order, but there would be 
primarily "an organic heterogeneity in the very 
structure of civil society, whether, for example, 
it be a question of economic or certain juridical 
and institutional structures.”-5- This feature of 
society is directly opposed to totalitarianism. 
Society would be an organic unity made up of a 
diversity of groups which would possess freedom 
and authority in their own sphere. Maritain 
appeals again to the writings of Yves Simon, one 
of his most brilliant students, for a most apt 
expression of this principle:
"The tendency to restrict the attributions 
of the State,— disquieting and dangerous, as 
long as it is accompanied by any sort of hos­
tility regarding the temporal supremacy of 
the State,— becomes purely and simply salu­
tary, as soon as the just notion of the State 
and its supremacy is duly re-established.
This restrictive tendency then only expresses 
the fundamental idea of all philosophy of au­
tonomy, to wit, that in an hierarchic whole, 
every function which can be assumed by the
1. True Humanism, p. 157.
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inferior must be exercized by the latter, 
under damage to the whole. For there is 
more perfection in a whole, all of whose 
p a r ta r e  full of life and of initiative, 
than in a whole whose parts are but in­
struments conveying the initiative of the 
superior organs of the community.nl
This principle of pluralism is expressly
sanctioned by Pius XI:
"It is an injustice, a grave evil and 
a disturbance of right order for a larger 
and higher organization to arrogate to it­
self functions which can be performed effic­
iently by smaller and lower bodies."2
Within society itself there are many groups or 
smaller societies made up of individuals, and a 
pluralist conception of society would give to 
these groups or smaller societies within society 
the fullest possible measure of autonomy.
This notion of pluralism would apply to the 
economic order. The evolution in the economic 
order and the great advances in technical and 
industrial organization call for a regulation of 
the industrial economy which would be fundament­
ally different from the regulation of the family 
economy. The very conditions of modern produc­
tion demand a certain measure of collectivization 
of ownership. Under the capitalist system, we
1. Yves Simon, Notes Sur Le Federalisme Proudhonien 
in Esprit, April 1, 1937.
S. Pius XI, Ouadragesimo Anno.
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have labor and capital uniting to produce, and 
the more this production is speeded by indus­
trial machinery, by better methods of organ­
ization and by more fruitful means of finance, 
the more collectivized the economy becomes. 
Collectivization should not be an end in itself. 
Rather, the industrial economy should subordinate 
collectivization to the demands of the common 
good and of man as a person. It follows from 
this that both the means and the fruits of pro­
duction should belong primarily, not to the 
State, but to those corporate bodies of men en­
gaged in the collectivist undertaking. These 
corporate bodies, composed of both laborers and 
shareholders, would be considered as moral per­
sons. Maritain suggests that eventually "a sys­
tem of co-ownership is substituted for the em­
ployment of workers at a wage so that money in­
vested on a basis of ownership and not of money—  
lending shall be subordinate and not superior to 
human values.”1 Man, then, will be the master, 
rather than the slave, of the machine. The
1. Freedom in the Modern World, p. 62.
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actual government of these corporate groups sh­
ould be left to the groups themselves and should 
be exercised by the State only when the groups, 
or individuals at the head of the groups, fail 
to exercise their rights and duties fittingly, 
thus inevitably impinging on the common good.
Maritain would have this same pluralist prin­
ciple applied to the juridic order. Unlike medi­
eval Europe which possessed a high degree of rel­
igious unity, modern civilization admits of wide 
religious diversity. These religious differences 
in the midst of the same civilization give rise 
to many serious problems. Maritain cannot accept 
the totalitarian solution that one single rule of 
faith should be imposed on all. This is opposed 
to sound reason and to the principle of man’s per­
sonal freedom in religious matters which is such 
an essential part of Christianity. He would sugg­
est that the State concede to each separate rel­
igious group its own juridic system based on its 
own. ethical system— "it appears that one day the 
legislature may be induced in mixed questions
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(matters that have at once and inseparably a 
civil and religious aspect) to concede to the 
several religious bodies within the State a 
separate legal constitution.”! Maritain does 
not deny that there is one objective morality, 
but he does believe that the legislator, who 
must be concerned with the common good of a 
concrete, historical people, should take into 
account the actual facts of their existence and 
therefore, too, their actually existing diverse 
moral ideals. In support of this he invokes 
St. Thomas’ principle of the lesser evil:
’’Dicendum. quod humanum regimen derivatur 
a divino regimine, et ipsum debet imitari. 
Deus, autem, quamvis sit omnipotens et sumnie 
bonus, permittit tamen aliqua mala fieri in 
universo, quae prohibere posset, ne eis sub- 
latis majors, bona tollerentur vel etiam pe« 
jora mala sequerentur. Sic igitur et in re­
gimine humano illi qui praesunt recte aliqua 
mala tolerant, ne aliqua bona impediantur, 
vel etiam ne aliqua mala pejora occurantur
Applying this principle, Maritain holds that 
in order to avoid greater evils the governing 
body could and should tolerate diverse religious 
forms varying more or less from the truth: ’’ritus
1. Freedom, in the Modern World, p. 62.
2. Summa Theologioa, II-II, 10, 11.
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infidelium sunt tolerandi.'1^  These various re­
ligious groups would be accorded their own Jur­
idical status, adapted, on the one hand, to their 
own condition, and on the other, to the general 
line of legislation leading towards the virtuous 
life. The governing body should endeavor to dir­
ect this diversity of forms towards the prescrip­
tions of the moral law in the fullest obtainable 
degree.
We have seen most of the hidden implications 
of the personalist, communal, and pluralist fea­
tures of Maritain’s society. It remains for us 
to distinguish clearly the spiritual and the 
temporal, the Ohurch and Society, and thus to 
see that Maritain’s political humanism demands 
of necessity an ordered relationship of the 
spiritual and the temporal, of the Church and 
Society. Civilization, or culture (the two terms 
will be considered as synonomous) has been aptly 
defined by Maritain as ’’that flowering which 
gives space for a rightly human life; is concer­
ned not only with the necessary material develop­
ment which permits the leading of a proper life
1. Summa Theologica, II-II, 10, 11.
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here below, but also and primarily with man’s 
moral development, the development of those spir­
itual and practical (artistic and ethical) ac­
tivities which rightly merit the name of human 
progress.”1 Civilization, then, is a natural 
thing. It is the fruit of an essential impulse 
of human nature, but in itself it is a work of 
the spirit and of freedom. This development is 
not only physical and material but also and 
primarily spiritual and moral. This does not 
mean, however, that religion is a tpart' of civ­
ilization, as was the case in pagan antiquity 
when a particular religion was identified with 
a particular civilization or culture, but rather 
religion, simply because there is a God Who 
created everything out of nothing, transcends 
all civilization and every culture; it is uni­
versal; it is not a part of man, nor of the world, 
nor of a culture, nor of civilization.
Culture or civilization, then, since they sire 
directed to an earthly end, must be directed and 
subordinated to the eternal life which is the end
1. True Humanism, p. 88
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of religion, and must strive therefore to make 
accessible to all the attainment of this higher 
eternal end. This does not mean that culture 
and civilization are merely instruments in the 
hands of religion, as was the case, to a certain 
extent, in the Middle Ages. Rather, they have 
their own specific end, namely, the good human 
life of men here on earth. Because they are 
concerned, however, with the things of time, 
they suffer the vicissitudes of time— "the or­
der of culture or civilization appears then as 
the order of the things of time, as the temporal 
order. **•*-
On the other hand, religion, concerned as it 
is with God and with an eternal life which is 
none other than a participation in the intimate 
life of God Himself, constitutes the spiritual 
order which, of its very nature, transcends the 
spiritual order. If the spiritual order vivifies 
and seeks to elevate the temporal order, it does 
so not as a part of the temporal order but in 
virtue of its transcendence and independence in
1* True Humanism, p. 90.
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regard to the temporal order.
This distinction between the spiritual and 
the temporal is essentially Christian and only 
has its full force and meaning for a Christian—  
"Render therefore to Caesar the things that are 
Caesar’s; and to God, the things that are God’s.’’^- 
The distinction, however, very valuable in itself 
for its spiritual and cultural significance, does 
present some serious problems for solution.
Maritain considers the first of these problems 
to be the problem of the Kingdom of God. The con­
cept 'of the Kingdom of God is not a social con­
cept; it is a supra-temporal concept. To realize 
the Kingdom of God is to realize union in the 
mystical body of Christ. What part is to be 
played in the attainment of the Kingdom of God 
by the spiritual and the temporal order? What 
are we to think of the world and of the earthly 
city in regard to the Kingdom of God?
In true scholastic fashion, Maritain considers 
here, too, the most important erroneous positions 
in regard to this problem. First of all, there
1. St. Matthew, Ch. 22, v. 21.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 73
is the satanooratlc notion of the world as the 
kingdom of the devil, as the domain of evil, as 
creation abandoned by God into the hands of the 
devil against whom we can only bear witness in 
the midst of perdition. This perverted notion 
had its origin in the Protestant Reformation 
and appears today in a slightly more concealed 
form among the disciples of Karl Barth. The 
rationalism of Descartes, embodying his scission 
between nature and grace, reached the same con­
clusion.
The second erroneous position is that the 
world itself is divine— the world in its tem­
poral existence is already and fully the King­
dom of God. This error has its seeds both in 
the East and in the West. In the East, this 
idea has a primarily mystical nature, and, as 
such, is known as a theophanio notion of the 
v/orld. Many of these heretical mystics go so 
far as to claim that, since the world itself 
is divine and already the Kingdom of God, man 
should be free from all law or constraint,
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regardless of whether these laws or constraints 
emanate from God, from nature, or from reason.
In the West, this error has a primarily polit­
ical nature, and, as such, is known as a theo­
cratic notion of the world. This would have 
the world, at least in appearance and in the 
organization of social life, the effective re­
alization of the Kingdom of God, It is clearly 
opposed to the explicit teaching of Christ:
”My kingdom is not of this world. f,l Neither 
aspect of this error had any real formal re­
cognition in the Middle Ages, although we do 
find traces of it in certain extremist theolog­
ians who believed that the Pope was supreme in 
the temporal as well as in the spiritual order.
The third erroneous position is primarily 
a modern one--the error of detached or anthro- 
pocentric humanism. This believes that the • 
world is given over to nature and to man, with­
out any reference to the sacred or to any divine 
transcendence. Either spiritual values are denied 
completely, or, if they are affirmed, they are
1. St. John. Ch. 18, v. 56.
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said to have no relation with, or bearing on, 
temporal values. The world is completely 
’’detached” from God; man is the center of the 
world. All things take their ’’cue” from man. 
Ludwig Feuerbach, a disciple of Hegel, gave 
philosophic expression, and therefore fresh im­
petus, to this anthropocentric humanism which 
really stems from the Renaissance. Gilson, 
quoting from Feuerbach’s Essence of Christian­
ity, attributes to Feuerbach the statement that 
”God has not created man in his own image and 
likeness: the worship of man under the name of 
God is the very essence of religion.”-*- This 
idea permeates every sphere of modern thought—  
art, literature, history, economics, sociology, 
etc. T.S. Eliot, a discerning critic, denounces 
its presence in the field of literature:
’’What I do wish to affirm is that the 
whole of modern literature is corrupted by 
what I call Secularism, that it is simply 
unaware of, simply cannot understand the 
meaning of, the primacy of the supernatural 
over the natural life; of something which I 
assume to be our primary concern.
Maritain resolves this problem of the Kingdom
1. E. Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Exper­
ience , p. E81.
2. T.S. Eliot, Essays Ancient and Modern, p. 110.
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of God by harmonizing the elements of truth la­
tent in the three erroneous positions outlined 
above:
"The truth about the world and the ear­
thly city is that they are the kingdom at 
once of man, of G-od, and of the devil....
The world belongs to God by right of creat­
ion; to the devil by right of conquest, be­
cause of sin; to Christ by right of victory 
over the first conqueror, by his Passion.
The task of the Christian in this world is 
to dispute his domain with the devil and 
wrench it from him. He must strive to this 
end in which he wall never fully succeed 
while time endures."1
History is ambivalent. The spiritual order tends 
towards God alone, w/hile the temporal order is a 
divided domain, leading at one and the same time 
to God and to evil.
Another problem presented by the distinction 
between the spiritual and the temporal is the 
problem of the temporal mission of the Christian.
The secular failure of the Christian in the mod­
ern -world must be admitted. In the medieval 
Christian order, spiritual principles acted in 
a large measure as a leaven in the temporal order. 
With the coming of modern times, the world, with its
1. True Humanism, p. 10E.
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anthropocentric humanism, has become progress­
ively detached from Christ. In the economic 
order, this detached humanism has taken the 
form of Capitalism. In the wake of this new 
movement, Christians as a whole have stood 
idly by, offering very little resistance, m a t  
is the reason for this secular failure of the 
Christian in the modern world? The chief rea­
son belongs to the intellectual order— Christians, 
both in fact and in spirit, are not aware that 
the principles of Christianity must be realized 
not only in the life of souls but in the socio­
temporal order as well. In what Maritain calls 
the "reflective age"l after medieval Christen­
dom, art and science and philosophy and the 
State became very conscious of themselves, but 
"there was no similar study of the social order 
as such or of the essential nature of its being."2 
The spirit of Christianity was present in many 
members of the Christian world, but it was not 
generally understood that this spirit was to be 
applied to the social order.
1. Freedom in the Modern World, p. 123.
2. Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 78
The Christian has a very definite role to 
play in the work of transforming the social 
system. A social, political and economic 
philosophy must be elaborated— a philosophy 
which m i l  not rest content with universal 
principles, but which must be capable of com­
ing down to the details of concrete realiz­
ation. There must be an integration to ethics 
of things in the domain of sociology, politics 
and economics. Universal principles must be 
applied to the social order as well as to the 
life of the individual. The Christian, how­
ever, cannot effect a vitally Christian trans­
formation of the temporal order in the same 
way as one effects other temporal transfor­
mations and revolutions. Christians must re­
new within themselves a profound spiritual and 
moral life and within society itself the moral 
ideas that govern the life of the social body 
as such, and then they should do everything in 
their power to have these awakened and vital 
principles act as a leaven in the social,econ­
omic and political world. The need for this
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intelligent awareness of our obligations as 
Christians to the temporal order is very poig­
nantly expressed by Maritain:
"The Christian body has at such a time 
as ours two opposite dangers that it needs 
to avoid: the danger of seeking sanctity 
only in the desert, and the danger of for­
getting the need of the desert for sanctity; 
the danger of enclosing in the cloister of 
the interior life and of private virtue the 
heroism it ought to share among mankind...”1
A vitally Christian social renewal will be fun­
damentally a moral renewal. The fruits of this 
moral renewal in the personal lives of Christians 
will then be applied to the temporal order, to 
the world, and to secular civilization and cul­
ture .
The problems arising from the distinction 
between the spiritual and the temporal— the pro­
blem of the Kingdom of God and the problem of 
the temporal role of the Christian— are thus 
solved. Briefly, in review, the Church is al­
ready the Kingdom of God in the spiritual order, 
but still only an approach to the true Kingdom 
of God which is outside time and history. The 
world, or the temporal order, belongs at one
1* Freedom in the Modern World, p. 145.
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and the same time to G-od, to mankind and to the 
devil. The Christian must strive for some pro­
portionate realization of universal transcending 
principles— principles ennobled by the Gospel—  
in the social, economic and political order.
We have presented Maritain’s metaphysical 
criticism of the major social and political sol­
utions in the modern world. His own political 
humanism, based on the nature of man as an in­
dividual and as a person, is personalist, commun- 
al, pluralist„ and founded on the ordered relat­
ionship of the spiritual and the temporal. For 
many, indeed for most, of his ideas, he is in­
debted to Aristotle and to St. Thomas Aquinas, 
but this does not mean that he preaches a return 
to the social and political organisms of the 
ancient or medieval world. These eternal prin­
ciples do not preclude the possibility of orig­
inal insights into, and ingenious applications 
to, changing historical circumstances. Maritain’s 
grasp of the pressing need of a largely indiv­
idualistic world for a deep sense of the dignity
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of the human person; his more precise formulat­
ion of the notion of the common good and of 
final ends in distinct genera; his emphasis on 
terminal freedom or freedom of autonomy; his 
more extensive application of the principle of 
pluralism to the economic and juridic order; 
and his clear defining of the relationship bet­
ween the spiritual and the temporal;— all these 
contributions justify us in concluding that 
Maritain is in his own merits an original and 
creative writer, deserving of the serious study 
of all social and political thinkers.
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